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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the Third Circuit Court. The 
jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals arises under §78-2a-
3(2) (d) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The first issue is whether the circuit court erred in denying 
a Rule 60(b)(1) motion to set aside a summary judgment for 
excusable neglect? The standard of review of this issue is whether 
the trial court abused its discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 
1114 (Utah App. 1989). 
The second issue presented is whether the circuit court erred 
in denying a Rule 60(b)(5) motion to set aside a summary judgment 
granting the dismissal of a counter-claim in excess of $20,000 in 
that such counter claim was outside the jurisdiction of the circuit 
court. The standard of review is that this court may freely 
substitute its determination of jurisdiction for that of the trial 
court. State Department of Social Services v. Vigil, 784 P.2d 1130 
(Utah 1989). 
These issues were preserved by a timely filing of a motion 
found in the record at page 103. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following provisions are reproduced in the Addendum: 
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
§78-4-7, U.C.A. 
§78-3-4, U.C.A. 
vi 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an action by a lessor against a lessee for unpaid rent 
with the lessee counter-claiming for substantial damage to property 
stored on the leased premises. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On May 20, 1993, plaintiff filed an action for eviction with 
a claim for unpaid rents. Record, p. 1. Defendant answered with 
a counter-claim for damage to property stored in the warehouse at 
issue. Record, p. 32. As the matter proceeded, there were two 
counsel for the plaintiffs. David Church represented plaintiff on 
the claim for rents and Robert Wallace represented the plaintiff in 
defense of the counter-claim. Record, p. 40. 
On May 31, 1994, counsel for Rogan withdrew. Record, P. 54. 
Essential to this appeal is that Rogan claims that he was unaware 
of this withdrawal. Record, p. 113. A Notice to Appear was sent 
to the incorrect address. Compare Record, p. 77 with p. 114. On 
June 15, 1994, Wallace filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
counter-claim. Record, p. 66. A hearing was held on that motion 
on July 28, 1994. Rogan was not present for reasons explained in 
the statement of facts. See Record, p. 78 and Addendum. 
On August 17, 1994, Church filed a motion for summary judgment 
on the rent claim. Record, p. 91. The Motion was granted without 
hearing on September 6, 1994. Rogan did not respond to either 
motion. 
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On October 6, 1994, Rogan filed a motion to set aside both 
default summary judgments for reasons explained in the statement of 
facts. Record, p. 103. The court denied the motion without 
hearing on November 10, 1994 and the formal order denying the 
motion was signed January 9, 1995. Record, p. 156. Rogan filed 
his notice of appeal on February 8, 1995. Record, p. 158. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff is a lessor of a storage warehouse in Salt Lake 
County. Defendant and appellant is an individual that leased space 
and put a substantial quantity of valuable property into the 
warehouse. The dispute between the parties arose when a water pipe 
broke and caused damage estimated at several hundred thousand 
dollars to Rembrandt etchings and other property stored in the 
facility. Rogan, not receiving compensation for the water damage 
as he believed he was due, quit paying rents. Hatch, the lessor, 
then brought an action for rents plus treble the rents as allowed 
by law. Rogan counter-claimed for $900,000 in damage to his 
property. Record, pp. 1, 32. 
Rogan hired one of the largest law firms in the state to 
defend the rent claim and to pursue his claim for damage to his 
property. Record, p. 32. As his affidavit explains, his counsel 
had told him that there would be large gaps of time in which he 
would not hear from them concerning the progress of the litigation. 
Record, p. 113. His counsel withdrew and sent the notice of 
withdrawal to an old address. Record, p. 114. Rogan admits that 
he received notice of some pleadings but assumed they were 
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informational copies and that his counsel was responding to them. 
Record, p. 114. Eventually, he learned that his counsel had 
withdrawn and that a hearing was set for July 20, 1994. He thought 
the hearing was to discuss the need for counsel and appeared at the 
court on July 20, 1994. Record, pp. 78, 114. Upon appearance, 
nobody was there and he learned that the hearing was for a motion 
for summary judgment which had been changed without prior notice to 
him to July 28, 1994. Rogan discussed with a court clerk that his 
son was being married out of state and he would be gone on July 28. 
The clerk of the court told him that the hearing date would be 
changed and he would be notified. To protect himself, Rogan sent, 
before the scheduled motion hearing, a certified letter to the 
clerk of the court confirming the conversation. Record, p. 78. 
Despite the conversation with the clerk of the court and the 
confirmation letter, the hearing was held anyway and summary 
judgment was entered against him dismissing his counter-claim with 
prejudice even though it exceeded the $20,000 jurisdictional limit 
stated in the Utah Code. Record, p. 79. 
Rogan was out of state for several weeks. When he came back 
he learned that the counter-claim had been dismissed and that a 
second summary judgment had been filed for the unpaid rents. Rogan 
had always understood that the case would not be resolved pending 
the rescheduled hearing, but the second motion was granted without 
a hearing. Record, p. 115. Upon learning of the summary judgment, 
Rogan took immediate steps to protect his interest. Record, pp. 
115, 122. Rogan then filed a timely Rule 60(b) motion to set aside 
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these judgments for excusable neglect and because the circuit court 
was without jurisdiction to rule on an $900,000 counter-claim. The 
circuit court affirmed its earlier ruling. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This brief shows that there were a series of mistakes which 
led to the entry of two summary judgments against the appellant. 
Sufficient evidence was presented at the trial court level to show 
that excusable neglect was present and that the trial court abused 
its discretion by failing to recognize that there was a good faith 
mistake made and that the appellant acted diligently in trying to 
protect his interests. 
The trial court also erred in not setting aside at least the 
judgment on the counter-claim as the jurisdictional amount of 
$20,000 was exceeded by several hundred thousand dollars. Even if 
the trial court had found correctly that excusable neglect was not 
present, there was no jurisdiction to enter both summary judgments 
for the plaintiff. 
x 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
IT WAS ERROR NOT TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT ON THE COUNTER-CLAIM 
A. Applicable Law 
There is, perhaps, no principle more fundamental than a court 
may not act where it does not have jurisdiction. The powers of a 
court are limited to those matters which may be traced to a source 
of jurisdiction. Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public 
Service Commission, 602 P.2d 696 (Utah 1979) . Following that 
general principle, the Circuit Court Act of 1977 provides for the 
jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of this state in Title 78, 
Chapter 4. Specifically, §78-4-7 provides that the circuit court 
has civil jurisdiction in all matters in which the sum claimed is 
less than $20,000. This grant of jurisdiction is reenforced by 
§78-3-4(3) which provides that judges of the district court may 
transfer to the circuit courts cases filed in the district court 
which also fall under the jurisdiction of the circuit court. This 
power to transfer cases implies that smaller cases are to be 
primarily considered in the circuit courts. 
In Maxwell v. Maxwell. 796 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1990), this 
court held that where a motion to vacate a judgment is based upon 
a claim of no jurisdiction the trial court has no discretion but to 
vacate the judgment if jurisdiction did not exist. Utah case law 
appears silent on whether a default leading to a judgment may stand 
where there was no jurisdiction, but other states have held that a 
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default judgment should be set aside where there was no 
jurisdiction for the claim made. VanNort v. Davis, 800 P.2d 1082 
(Okl. App. 1990). 
There is no recent Utah case law concerning whether counter-
claims in a circuit court which exceed the $20,000 jurisdiction 
deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction. However, in Hardy v. 
Meadows, 264 P. 968 (Utah 1928), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
a counter-claim exceeding the jurisdictional limits of a city court 
deprive the city court of jurisdiction over the counter-claim. See 
also Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1987) and Burns 
Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Insurance Company, 851 P.2d 1209 
(Utah App. 1993), wherein this court held that circuit court 
jurisdiction is limited to that defined by statute. 
Other states have held that when a claim seeks more than the 
jurisdictional amount of the court, the court does not have 
jurisdiction over the subject matter. See Alder v. Crest 
Corporation, 472 P.2d 310 (Idaho 1970); Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. 
Portland Trading Company. 608 P.2d 577 (Or. App. 1980). 
In summary, a fair statement of existing law is that a court 
may act only where it has jurisdiction and jurisdiction of the 
circuit courts in Utah is defined by statute to be civil matters 
involving claims of less than $20,000. A claim in excess of the 
jurisdictional amount is outside the jurisdiction of the circuit 
court. 
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B. Judgment on the Counter-claim Should be Set Aside. 
If one applies the facts of this case to the objectively 
stated rules above, it becomes readily apparent that the judgment 
dismissing with prejudice the counter-claim should have been set 
aside by the trial court. The counter-claim, found at Record, 
p.32, was for $911,400.00. This is obviously far in excess of the 
$20,000.00 jurisdictional limit of the circuit court. 
Rogan moved under Rule 60(b)(5) that the judgment should be 
set aside because it was void. Record, p. 103. The circuit court 
should have followed Maxwe11 v. Maxwe11, described above, and 
vacated the judgment upon a finding of no jurisdiction. The 
conclusion is surprisingly simple, and the denial of the Rule 
60(b)(5) request was plain error. 
In State Department of Social Services v. Vigil, 784 P.2d 1130 
(Utah 1989), the court held a challenge to jurisdiction is a matter 
for which this court may freely substitute its judgment for that of 
the trial court. This standard of review allows this court to 
correct the error made in the circuit court by declaring the 
judgment entered upon the counter-claim to be void and without 
legal effect. 
II. 
FAILURE TO SET ASIDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ORIGINAL CLAIM 
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
A. Applicable Law 
The recitation of facts describes a scenario in which a person 
who thought he was represented by counsel had, in effect, defaults 
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entered on motions for summary judgment against him despite good 
faith efforts to appear and defend against the two motions once he 
understood his procedural status. 
The general rule is that the judgment is to be sustained 
unless cause to set it aside exists under Rule 60(b). Arnica Mutual 
Insurance Company v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989) . The 
reasons for setting aside a judgment under Rule 60(b) include 
excusable neglect. Such a motion must be brought within three 
months of entry of the judgment. Existence of excusable neglect is 
for consideration by the trial court and will be reversed on appeal 
only where it is shown an abuse of discretion has occurred. 
Erickson v. Schenkers International Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147 
(Utah 1994). 
One seeking to set aside a judgment under 60(b) must not only 
show that the motion is timely, but also that there is a 
meritorious defense. Ericksen. Id. 
Motions to set aside a judgment for excusable neglect are 
generally denied where there is a failure of a party to be 
diligent. Motions to set aside judgments may be granted when a 
party has acted good faith and a default results from genuine 
mistake. May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109 (Utah 1984); Russell v. 
Martell. 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). 
B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion. 
Rogan made a timely Rule 60(b) (1) motion. The final order on 
the summary judgment concerning the counter-claim was granted 
August 3, 1994. Record, p. 79. The judgment on the original 
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claim, resolving all issues in the litigation, was entered 
September 12, 1994. Record, p. 98. The Rule 60(b)(1) and (5) 
motion was filed on or about October 6, 1994. Record, p. 103. 
Filing the motion about three weeks after the last judgment was 
entered is clearly within the three month requirement of Rule 
60(b) . 
The facts supporting setting aside the judgment are 
compelling. As explained in the record, at page 113, 117, and 122, 
Rogan had been told by his own counsel that he would not hear 
anything for months. The motion to withdraw as counsel was sent to 
an incorrect address. Rogan admits that he later received 
pleadings addressed to his home, but thought that they were 
information copies. When he realized that his counsel had 
withdrawn, Rogan appeared pursuant to notice given for a hearing on 
July 20, 1994, the purpose of which was uncertain to him. Upon 
appearing, he learned that the hearing had been set without notice 
to him for July 28, 1994. The new hearing date fell upon a date he 
planned to be out of state to attend his son's wedding. He 
discussed the matter with the clerk of the court and claims to have 
been told that a new date would be set and he did not need to 
appear. Out of caution, a certified letter was sent to the clerk 
of the court confirming the conversation. This letter was received 
by the court on July 26, 1994, two days before the hearing. Mr. 
Rogan saved the return receipt showing that it had been delivered. 
Record, pp. 117, 120. Rogan understood that no action would be 
taken pending another hearing to be set in the future, but the 
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court proceeded with the entry of two summary judgments on his 
default. 
Rogan1s appearance at a court hearing and subsequent sending 
of a certified letter to the court shows that he had a real 
interest in the conduct of the litigation once he learned that his 
counsel was no longer participating. He actively took steps to 
avoid a negative impact pending retaining new counsel. Any neglect 
which led to the entry of the judgments is excusable in that Rogan 
understood that he had taken steps to protect himself and thought 
he was being accommodated by the court allowing him to leave the 
state for an extended period to be followed by a rescheduled 
hearing. 
The circuit court abused its discretion in that it failed to 
recognize that judgments entered upon default are not favored in 
the law and that any reasonable excuse ought to be sufficient cause 
to grant relief. Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. 
Larsen. Contractor, 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). Mr. Rogan acted in 
a manner consistent with one who was attempting to protect his 
interest but got caught up in either an apparent misunderstanding 
or an oversight on the part of the court. Absent some affirmative 
evidence that Rogan acted in a careless or disinterested manner, 
the policy disfavoring default judgments should have been followed 
and the judgments set aside. 
The final 60(b) element that there be an arguable defense is 
also present. Utah has not spoken recently to the obligation of a 
landlord in a commercial setting for damage to a tenant's property. 
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This silence is, perhaps, due to the fact that the obligation is 
obvious. In Farr v. Wasatch Chemical Company, 143 P.2d 281 (Utah 
1943), a landlord was held liable for failure to maintain a 
warehouse to meet the known requirements of the tenant. In Keller-
Loup Construction Company v. Gerstner, 476 P.2d 272 (Colo. App. 
1970) , the landlord was held liable for failure to maintain a water 
pipe resulting in damage to property of a tenant. Under these 
rulings, Rogan arguably may be responsible for the payment of some 
rent but may also have offsetting claims under his counter-claim 
for damage to his property. Absent a trial to discover the scope 
and terms of the obligations of the parties, there is an arguable 
defense that rent may not even be due. 
Certainly, a judgment of treble the amount claimed in the 
context of no jurisdiction for the counter-claim, a default entry 
of summary judgment, and circumstances wherein the court itself was 
involved in leading Rogan to excusable neglect, raises a 
substantial question of whether such a judgment ought to stand in 
light of available defenses and the counter-claim. This court 
should find that an abuse of discretion occurred under these 
circumstances and set aside the judgments. 
In addition to excusable neglect, there is a substantial 
question of whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to enter a 
judgment on the original claim where it lacked jurisdiction on the 
counter-claim. That question has not been resolved in Utah law. 
Some help is found in Carreathers v. Carreathers. 654 P.2d 871 
(Colo. App. 1982), there, plaintiff filed a forcible entry and 
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detainer action and the defendant answered claiming to be the owner 
of the property and that the property had a value in excess of the 
jurisdictional limit of the court. Though this was not a true 
counter-claim, the court recognized that the defense raised, and 
which ultimately led to the plaintiff having to convey a deed to 
the defendant, made the total dispute in excess of the 
jurisdictional limit of the trial court. 
Also helpful is Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P. 2d 1230 (Utah App. 
1987). There, two defendants asserted lien interests in certain 
property in the amount of $15,000 and $50,000 in answers to a 
complaint concerning real property. The court held that the 
circuit court, whose jurisdiction was $10,000 at the time, did not 
have jurisdiction over the entire dispute where there were claims 
in excess of $10,000. 
Finally, §78-4-7 talks in terms of the circuit court having 
jurisdiction in all matters if the sum claimed is less than 
$20,000. The term "sum" is not defined but could reasonably be 
read to mean the total amount at issue in any pending lawsuit. 
Otherwise, the rule would have to be that claims and counter-claims 
arising out of the same subject matter are split between the 
district and circuit courts depending on amount or that the circuit 
court would have jurisdiction over all claims provided the claim 
filed by the plaintiff was within the jurisdictional limit. 
Both of these alternatives are contrary to good policy. The 
splitting of claims only increases the amount of litigation in the 
courts and sets up lawsuits for differing results from different 
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triers of fact. Allowing the circuit court to consider counter-
claims in excess of $20,000 would be to avoid the policy expressed 
in Title 78 that circuit courts have a jurisdictional limit to 
consider more minor matters than the district court. The only 
logical conclusion is that jurisdiction of the circuit courts 
should be interpreted to mean that if any party claims more than 
$20,000 then the case belongs in the district courts. 
To avoid the problems that come with separating claims and 
counter-claims into different courts based on jurisdictional 
amounts, this court should hold that when a counter-claim is in 
excess of $20,000, jurisdiction is lost and the entire case should 
be in the district court. In terms of this case, even if there was 
not excusable neglect, the circuit court was without jurisdiction 
to enter the summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
This brief has shown that the circuit court lacked 
jurisdiction to consider a counter-claim in excess of $900,000. 
The court should have declined to rule on the counter-claim and 
should have set aside the judgment entered on the counter-claim as 
beyond its jurisdiction. 
This brief has also shown that there was excusable neglect and 
that the trial court abused its discretion in not vacating the 
judgment entered on the principal claim of the plaintiff. 
Additionally, with the counter-claim being in excess of the $20,000 
jurisdictional limit, the circuit court was deprived of 
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jurisdiction over the original claim. Utah law is not complete on 
this point but common sense dictates that other approaches would 
multiply litigation and have a potential for differing results on 
claims of the parties arising under the different jurisdiction of 
different courts. 
This court is respectfully requested to set aside the two 
judgments entered by the circuit court for lack of jurisdiction and 
excusable neglect. 
DATED THIS 14th day of April, 1995. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
GREGORY J>/S^N0ERSip:ESQ. 
SANDRA Lr STEINVOORT, ESQ, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure A-2 
§78-3-4, U.C.A A-4 
§78-4-7, U.C.A A-6 
Letter dated July 20, 1994 from Record, p. 78 A-8 
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RULE 60, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
A-2 
Ride 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining amy relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
§ 7 8 - 3 - 4 , U.C.A. 
A - 4 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to circuit court — 
Appeals — Jurisdiction when court does not 
exist. 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and crimi-
nal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other 
writs necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) Under the general supervision of the presiding officer of the Judicial 
Council and subject to policies established by the Judicial Council, cases filed 
in the district court, which are also within the concurrent jurisdiction of the 
circuit court, may be transferred to the circuit court by the presiding judge of 
the district court in multiple judge districts or the district court judge in 
single judge districts. The transfer of these cases may be made upon the 
court's own motion or upon the motion of either party for adjudication. When 
an order is made transferring a case, the court shall transmit the pleadings 
and papers to the circuit court to which the case is transferred. The circuit 
court has the same jurisdiction as if the case had been originally commenced 
in the circuit court and any appeals from final judgments shall be to the Court 
of Appeals. 
(4) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district 
court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3. 
(5) The district court has jurisdiction to review agency adjudicative pro-
ceedings as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, 
and shall comply with the requirements of that chapter, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 
(6) When a circuit court is given original or appellate jurisdiction of a 
matter and no such court exists in the county of proper venue, the district 
court shall have jurisdiction. Notwithstanding Section 78-3-14.5, criminal 
fines and forfeitures collected in such cases shall be distributed as if filed in 
the circuit court. Notwithstanding Section 78-3-16.5, civil filing fees in such 
cases shall be the same as if filed in the circuit court, ^he party filing a 
pleading or other document shall, at the time of filing, provide proof that the 
pleading or other document qualifies for the circuit court fee. 
§ 7 8 - 4 - 7 , U.C.A. 
A-6 
78-4-7. Civil jurisdiction — Exceptions. 
The circuit court has civil jurisdiction, both law and equity, in all matters if 
the sum claimed is less than $20,000, exclusive of court costs, except: 
(1) in actions to determine the title to real property, but not excluding 
actions to foreclose mechanics' liens; 
(2) in actions of divorce, child custody, and paternity; 
(3) in actions under the Utah Uniform Probate Code; 
(4) in actions to review the decisions of any state administrative 
agency, board, council, commission, or hearing officer; 
(5) in actions seeking remedies in the form of extraordinary writs; and 
(6) in all other actions where, by statute, jurisdiction is exclusively 
vested in the district court or other trial or appellate court. 
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 *G<^Mvin Rogan 
rVcJk ftjV^^-'-1 South Sandrun Road 
<*$& AO 6^ S a l t L a k e City, Utah 84103 
VlV^  (801) 355-6717 CERTIFIED MAIL S2^ 
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
July 20, 1994 
Debbie Peterson, Deputy Clerk 
Salt Lake Department Court 
Third Circuit Court Building 
451 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: CASE NO. 930005684 CV 
HONORABLE PHILIP K. PALMER 
PAUL HATCH, DBA P H PROPERTIES 
-VS-
KEVIN ROGAN, DBA SIERRA PROPERTIES 
Dear Ms. Peterson: 
This is to confirm my conversation with your office (Candy) 
at approximately 8:30 am today, July 20, 1994, regarding my 
notice to appear. I was informed by Candy that the above 
referenced case had been set-over to July 28, 1994, at 9:00 
am. I had not received any notice of this change of date 
from the 20th to the 28th, and my plans and commitments (my 
son's wedding out of state, planned for over six irfonths) will 
not have me returning to Salt Lake City until after August 
10, 1994. I respectively request a date for this case be set 
for sometime after that. 
Please note I was there and available to appear on the 20th, 
as requested by the Court. Had I been sent notice of the 
change, I would have communicated the date conflict and 
request sooner. 
I appreciate your consideration and look forward to receiving 
your response as soon as possible. 
Very truly yours, 
| w /Cp^— 
Kevin Rogarr 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 14th day of April, 1995, I caused 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to 
be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
David L. Church 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
560 East 200 South Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Robert R. Wallace, Esq. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
-& 
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